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In the 1990s, transition  economies were rearranging their monetary 
regimes. This paper compares the chosen regimes based on the level of 
discretionary power and the ability to control inflation. Results show that 
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1- Introduction   
 
Following their independence in the late 1980’s, almost all transition economies 
established a central bank to enact a national monetary policy. As mentioned by Schuler 
(1996), the conventional view among monetary economists was that every independent 
country should have its own central bank in order to conduct independent monetary 
policy. In contrast, around the time of the independence movement, eleven countries gave 
up their monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank. Clearly the real difference 
in these two movements revolves around the degree of discretionary monetary policy. 
The aim of this paper is to test whether transition economies with non-
discretionary monetary regimes, i.e. hard pegs, (defined as adopting a currency board or 
maintaining a de facto exchange rate peg) experience more stable and lower inflation 
than the transition economies with discretionary regimes, i.e. flexible regimes, (defined 
as having flexible exchange rates). These definitions are developed from the exchange 
rate regime flexibility index of Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), which assigns values 
from 1 to 13, where we consider 1-4 as hard peg regimes and 5-13 as flexible regimes. 
We also test to see whether transition economies that are on the fast track to join the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) experience lower levels of inflation.
1  
 
2-Panel Analysis of the Determinants of Inflation 
The contribution of this paper is that it is the first to explicitly focus on the transition 
countries’ ability to maintain stable and low inflation by comparing the structure of their 
                                                 
1 We define countries being on the ‘fast track’ to join the EMU as those countries that joined the European 
Union in 2004.  
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monetary  institutions.    For general comparison we conduct a difference in mean and 
difference in variance test for the inflation of two groups of transition economies: (i) hard 
peg regimes and (ii) flexible regimes, over the time period 1995-2001.
2 The results 
reported in Table 1 show that the hard peg regimes experienced significantly less volatile 
and lower inflation when compared to the flexible regimes. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  Looking at Table 1, it is evident that our sample is characterized by high variance 
and high overall inflation. We want to conduct a study of the impact that monetary 
regimes have on inflation, but our analysis might be biased by the high variation in 
inflation. Following Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002) we correct for this potential 
bias by capturing inflation as the rate of depreciation in the real value of money. Table 1 
also contains the difference in mean and difference in variance test for the rate of 
depreciation in the real value of money and results are identical to those using inflation. 
  To further analyze the impact of monetary regimes, we collected panel data on 
twenty-five transition economies, from 1995-2001, and our analysis builds off of the 
standard model of inflation. We expect that the transition economies with hard peg 
regimes will better control inflation. Testing the effect of hard peg regimes, will serve as 
a robustness check to the findings of Bleaney and Francisco (2003), which analyzes 
developing countries, excluding those in transition, and finds hard pegs reduce inflation.  
  Also, we propose that being on the fast track to join the EMU may produce more 
disciplined policies, as the countries have to meet certain convergence criteria. This case 
                                                 
2  The inflation data come from the IMF and included twenty-six IMF classified transition economies, six 
of which had hard peg regimes.   
  4
is interesting because it does not involve an “institutional” change, but more of a change 
in the self-discipline of the government. For example, Rogoff (1985) and Hanke and 
Schuler (1994) have documented how non-institutional factors can influence inflation. 
However, it could also be that the fast track to join the EMU may not significantly impact 
inflation in transition economies, because it is only an announcement to join at a later 
date, and may not significantly tie the hands of the monetary authority.    
   To examine the determinants of inflation as measured by the rate of depreciation 
in the real value of money, we estimate a panel regression that takes the following 
general form:
3  
Dit = M΄itβ1 + X΄itβ2 + Ci + εit   i=1,…,N  and  t=1,…,T   (1) 
Where D stands for the rate of depreciation in the real value of money of country i at time 
t, t denotes years from 1995 to 2001, β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, 
M is a vector of monetary regime indicators, X is a vector of control variables that 
closely conforms to what has been previously used in the literature, C are the fixed 
effects for each country, and ε is the error term.  
  We include four monetary regime indicators, where the first indicator is standard 
in the previous literature, and the following three indicators are our contribution to the 
model of transition economies.
4 First, we include the index of legal central bank 
independence, developed by Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002). This index is 
                                                 
3 All data are from the CIA World Fact Book and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.  
4 Choice of the monetary regime is taken as exogenous following Hanke (2000) and Fatas and Rose (2001).  
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expected to carry a negative sign because increased independence implies that the central 
bank is less exposed to seigniorage pressure, and thus may experience lower inflation. 
Second, we include the Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) exchange rate flexibility index, 
which is expected to carry a positive sign, showing that when discretion is increased, 
inflation will be higher. Third, we include a control dummy for the years in which a 
country had a hard peg regime, which is expected to carry a negative sign, showing that 
hard pegs lead to lower inflation. Last, we include a dummy variable for the countries on 
the fast track to join the EMU, which is expected to carry a negative sign, to show that 
the being on the ‘fast track’ can act as a non-institutional limitation on discretionary 
policy and lead to less inflation. 
We include four control variables closely based on the literature for modeling 
inflation that capture fiscal, economic, and structural influences. First, the government 
fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP is expected to carry a positive sign because of the 
assumption that fiscal motives drive inflation pressures. Second, according to the 
economic literature on inflation and economic growth, such as Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh 
(2002) there is an inverse relation between economic growth and inflation. However, the 
causal relation is not agreed upon, so the annual real GDP growth rate is treated as 
endogenous and is expected to carry a negative sign. Third, the country’s openness to 
trade, measured as a country’s imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, could 
potentially carry a positive or negative sign as the current literature is somewhat 
divergent. Romer (1993) has found a negative relationship; however, Bleaney (1999) 
argues that the once robust negative relationship between openness and inflation is 
disappearing in the 1990’s. Last, the share of the value added of agriculture in GDP is  
  6
expected to carry a positive sign based on the arguments of Cukierman, Edwards, and 
Tabellini (1992) that the agricultural sector is difficult to tax. Following this logic, the 
countries with more pronounced agricultural sectors, may rely more on seigniorage, 
which may lead to higher inflation.  
[Table 2 about here] 
  The estimated determinants of the rate of depreciation in the real value of money 
are presented in Table 2.
5 Note that the regression specifications differ by the included 
monetary regime indicators.
6 Our base model seems to fit the data well, as our R-squared 
measure remained around 0.78. Also, the control variables all retained the expected signs 
and had varying degrees of significance.  
The variables of interest in our analysis are the monetary regime indicators. The 
previous literature’s model of inflation is found in specification [a], which includes the 
control variables as well as the central bank independence measure. Central bank 
independence is found to be significant in all specifications that it was included and of 
the expected negative sign. We then build on this base regression by adding the other 
three monetary regime indicators in various combinations. 
The Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) exchange rate flexibility index was positive 
and significant at the 1% level in specifications [b] and [c], the specifications without the 
hard peg control. This shows that increases in the degree of exchange rate flexibility will 
                                                 
5 All regression specifications included country fixed effects, which are available upon request to the 
authors. Also, regressions were estimated with year fixed effects, and results remained virtually unchanged. 
6 Specifications [f], [g], and [h] include both the hard peg indicator and exchange rate flexibility index, this 
is done to test if the exchange rate regime flexibility index has any explanatory power after the hard peg 
regimes are accounted for.   
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result in higher inflation. However, the exchange rate regime flexibility index is 
significant at only the 10% level in specification [f] and lost its significance in 
specifications [g] and [h], the specifications with the hard peg control. This confirms the 
findings of Bleaney and Francisco (2003) that only hard pegs impact inflation. 
The hard peg control was negative and significant at the 1% level in specifications 
[d] and [e], the specifications without the exchange rate regime flexibility index. This 
result implies that countries with hard pegs experience significantly less inflation relative 
to countries that have flexible regimes. Furthermore, the hard peg control retained its 
negative sign and was significant at the 5 % and 1% level in specifications [f], [g], and 
[h], the specifications that included the exchange rate regime flexibility index. Again this 
result confirms the hypothesis that only hard pegs matter.  
  The fast track to join the EMU had the expected negative sign and the estimated 
coefficient was found to be significantly different from zero in three of the four 
specifications in which it was included. The one specification that the fast track lost its 
significance, was specification [d], which did not include the exchange rate flexibility 
index. Overall, our results imply that being on the fast track to join the EMU, a non-
institutional regime change, significantly lowers inflation. 
  Interpreting the impact of our monetary regime indicators reveals that adopting a 
hard peg, along with having an independent central bank, is the most effective way to 
fight inflation. Our results indicate that transition countries with hard peg regimes will on 
average experience less depreciation of real value of money by 0.201 relative to flexible 
regimes. Also, we find that raising the central independence index by one degree will on 
average lesson the depreciation of real money by 0.187. Furthermore, our results show  
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that whenever a country’s exchange rate flexibility index is increased by one degree of 
flexibility, the country will on average experience more depreciation of real money by 
0.015, and likewise decreasing flexibility will lower the rate of depreciation of real 
money. Finally, our results reveal that those transition countries that are on the fast track 
to join the EMU, on average experience less depreciation of real value of money by 0.069 




This paper strongly advocates that changes in monetary regimes towards those that limit 
discretionary power are necessary to significantly impact inflation in transition 
economies. Our results suggest that transition economies that replace existing central 
banking regimes with a hard peg regime should experience lower inflation. This study 
helps to strengthen the existing literature on the benefits of adopting hard pegs, as these 
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Table 1: Difference in Mean and Difference in Variance Tests (1995-2001) 
 
Inflation Mean  Variance 
Flexible Regime  93.43  8332.46 
Hard Peg Regime  11.31  239.21 
Flexible Regime—Hard Peg Regime  82.12***  8093.25*** 
Statistical Difference Test  t = 3.93  F = 34.83 
    
Rate of Depreciation in the Real Value of Money  Mean  Variance 
Flexible Regime  0.24  0.02 
Hard Peg Regime  0.09  0.01 
Flexible Regime—Hard Peg Regime  0.15***  0.01** 
Statistical Difference Test  t = 2.96  F = 2.81 
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Table 2: Determinants of the Depreciation in the Real Value of Money (1995-2001) 
 
Specifications     
   [a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h] 
          
Central Bank Independence Index  -0.1888** -0.1968** -0.2267** -0.1536* -0.1744** -0.1732* -0.1922**   
   (2.03) (2.21) (2.53) (1.75) (2.00) (1.97) (2.18)   
Exchange Rate Flexibility Index   0.0184***  0.0161***     0.0095*  0.0063  0.0081 
        (4.37)  (3.86)    (1.70)  (1.17)  (1.45) 
Hard Peg Regime        -0.2319*** -0.2325*** -0.1575** -0.1833*** -0.1719*** 
         (4.72) (4.72) (2.41) (2.83) (2.62) 
Fast Track to Join EMU    -0.0768**   -0.0456  -0.0614*   -0.0683** 
   (2.45)  (1.50)  (1.95)  (2.16) 
           
           
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)  0.0025 0.0013 0.0017 0.0041 0.0043 0.0030 0.0036 0.0035 
   (0.69) (0.38) (0.49) (1.21) (1.25) (0.87) (1.04) (1.01) 
Real GDP Growth (Lag 1 period)  -0.0125*** -0.0124*** -0.0123*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0124*** -0.0130*** 
   (8.87) (9.37) (9.14) (9.58) (9.49) (9.58) (9.43)  (10.16) 
Trade Volume (% of GDP)  0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
   (3.40) (3.67) (3.58) (3.94) (3.91) (3.89) (3.86) (3.85) 
Agriculture Value Added (% of GDP)  0.0121*** 0.0119*** 0.0122*** 0.0131*** 0.0133*** 0.0127*** 0.0131*** 0.0146*** 
   (4.73) (4.92) (4.97) (5.45) (5.52) (5.29) (4.42) (6.54) 
           
           
Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
          
R-Squared  0.74 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 
Number of Observations  175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
 
Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis, the exchange rate flexibility index is from Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), the 
independence of central bank index is from Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002), and estimated country fixed effects available 
upon request to the authors. Significance levels are represented by: 
*** 1%, 
** 5%, 
* 10% 